متافیزیک صلح؛ درباره متافیزیک دولت و امتناع هستی‌شناختی صلح

چکیده مقاله

This article examines the metaphysical presuppositions underlying political conceptions of peace by focusing on the dominant conceptual metaphor through which the modern state has been understood: the state as a person. Rather than approaching peace primarily as a normative or institutional problem, it asks a prior ontological question: peace between whom? Drawing on cognitive metaphor theory, particularly the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the article reconstructs the conceptual consequences of understanding the state as an autonomous artificial person endowed with unity, will, agency, responsibility, and self-preservation. Hobbes provides the decisive modern formulation of this metaphor. Once states are understood as autonomous political persons lacking a common superior authority, interstate relations reproduce a structural condition analogous to the state of nature. Peace therefore cannot be ontologically primary; it remains contingent, constructed, and vulnerable to the continuing possibility of conflict. The article argues that this difficulty is not merely empirical or institutional but rooted in the conceptual architecture of modern political ontology. Consequently, a different conception of lasting peace would require reconsidering the metaphysical assumptions through which the modern state itself is understood.